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Abstract—The growing popularity of social networks and the
increasing need for publishing related data mean that protec-
tion of privacy becomes an important and challenging problem
in social networks. This paper describes the (k, l )-anonymity
model used for social network graph anonymization. The
method is based on edge addition and is utility-aware, i.e. it is
designed to generate a graph that is similar to the original one.
Different strategies are evaluated to this end and the results
are compared based on common utility metrics. The outputs
confirm that the naı¨ve idea of adding some random or even
minimum number of possible edges does not always produce
useful anonymized social network graphs, thus creating some
interesting alternatives for graph anonymization techniques.
Keywords—graph-modification, social networks, privacy-
preserving publication of data, graph anonymization, database
security.
1. Introduction
In recent years, the extensive use of social networks, such
as Facebook, Twitter or MySpace, in family or friendship
communications, as well as in political, social, economic,
educational, cultural and religious activities, has led many
researchers to focus on various aspects of this highly uti-
lized social communication tool (social network). Online
social networks have provided many data sharing platforms.
Due to the quickly increasing popularity of social network
sites on the Web, disclosure of user identity becomes an
important problem. Since the risk has a devastating im-
pact on the daily life of the people involved (for exam-
ple, disclosure of sensitive data, such as e-mails, instant
messages, or private relationships), protecting user privacy
has become an important and challenging problem in on-
line social networks. Anonymization of the social network
structure [1], [2] is a common approach to protecting user
privacy.
A social network may be modeled as a graph, where
vertices represent individuals, organizations or users, and
edges represent connections, relationships between users or
information flows [3]. Many researchers have focused on
studying the problem of user privacy in online social net-
works [4]–[8]. To improve the security of social networks,
various social network data anonymization techniques have
been proposed [9]–[15]. These anonymization approaches
are designed based on the principle of k-anonymity.
Anonymization methods are used in undirected social net-
work graphs. Furthermore, these approaches anonymize
a social network by inserting and/or deleting edges and ver-
tices in the graph. Since the social network graph structure
has been changed by anonymization methods, the utility-
related value of social network decreases. For example, if
the relationship between two users A and B is removed,
user A cannot retrieve sensitive data of user B, and user B
will not be able to share sensitive data with user A. If
user A is removed, their existence is ignored in the social
network. Therefore, developing anonymization methods to
protect user privacy in social networks without experienc-
ing the loss of information continues to be an outstanding
problem that is still difficult to solve [16].
Ideally, an anonymized social network should protect
the privacy of individuals with a minimum loss in its
utility-related value, ensuring that an analysis based on
anonymized social network data is very similar to that based
on its original counterpart [17]. Therefore, the problem of
maintaining the utility of data is very important in the pro-
cess of anonymization of social network data. By referring
high levels of utility of data, we mean strict preservation
of the pure information bits carried by the original social
network data. The information that is distorted and dif-
fers, significantly, from the original will probably provide
unreliable analysis results. However, most of the existing
anonymization techniques fail to generate anonymized so-
cial network data with a high degree of utility [17]. Thus,
it is important to understand and model the utility of social
network data being published by relying on utility-aware
metrics [18].
Social networks are usually anonymized based on some
computational privacy models. This paper applies the (k, l)-
anonymity model which was initiallty defined by Feder et
al. in 2008 [19]. The authors suggested to use edge addition
to implement the model. However, this initial definition
suffers from some practical issues that were later addressed
in the improved version created by Stokes and Torra [20].
In this definition, a graph is called (k, l)-anonymous if for
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Fig. 1. The original graph (a) and its anonymized version based
on edge addition with highlighted new edges (b).
every vertex v in the graph there exist at least k− 1 other
vertices that share at least l of their neighbors with v. The
authors suggest to introduce some fake nodes or even to
remove all risky nodes to produce an anonymous graph.
Although the modification procedures are easy to realize,
the usefulness of these suggestions is not evaluated by us-
ing utility measures commonly referred to in the graph
anonymization literature. Unfortunately, there is the risk
that node removal deletes all nodes of the graph, since
removing some risky nodes (along with their connected
edges) introduces new risky nodes. Additionally, introduc-
ing new nodes does not satisfy the privacy requirement
in practice, since they do not correspond to distinct in-
dividuals [20]. Usually, the amount of changes made to
the social graph is used to control the utility distortion in
structural-based anonymization [21]–[24]. However, this
metric does not consider the impacts on the social links’
structure, which has a serious impact on the graph prop-
erties [25]. For instance, consider the graph shown in
Fig. 1a. If an attacker knows exactly two neighbors of
a victim node in the graph, his chance to identify the vic-
tim distinctly in the graph is, on average, more than 90%
in average. This means that in order to remedy the risk
based on naive node deletion, the algorithm has to remove
almost all nodes in the original graph. However, adding
some new edges, as shown in the Fig. 1b, deprives the
attacker of this possibility.
In this paper, a mathematical model is applied to enforce
the privacy requirement of (k, l)-anonymity to minimize
the cost function related to the distortion of utility of the
anonymization process. The aim of this study is to propose
a general mathematical model to realize (k, l)-anonymity
in social network graphs. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first general procedure that addresses the (k, l)-
anonymity problem in graphs.
In summary, we offer the following main contributions:
1. We develop a general mathematical programming
model to produce a (k, l)-anonymous graph for l ≥ 1
and k ≥ 2.
2. We linearize the anonymization constraints in our
mathematical programming approach, which makes
it solvable by mixed integer programming (MIP)
solvers.
3. We show that the naı¨ve idea of adding some ran-
dom or even the minimum number of possible edges
does not always produce useful anonymized social
network graphs.
4. We compare the performance of the proposed ap-
proach with the existing approach. The results show
that our approach changes slightly the key character-
istics of the graph and produces more useful graphs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 reviews some related works. Section 3 defines the
preliminary concepts that our work is based upon. The
pro-posed method is described in Section 4 and is then
evaluated in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. Related Work
Here, a number of graph-modification techniques are re-
viewed as graph anonymization methods. To preserve the
privacy of users in the process of publishing data through
anonymization methods, the process can be fully random
or may be subject to some constraints, meaning that these
methods are called random perturbation methods and con-
strained perturbation methods, respectively.
Random perturbation methods are based on introducing
random noise to the original data. In the case of graphs,
two main approaches exist: (a) rand add/del that randomly
adds and deletes edges from the original graph, and (b) rand
switch that exchanges edges between pairs of nodes. Ran-
dom perturbation techniques are generally the simplest form
of graph modification techniques and are less complex.
Thus, they are able to deal with large networks, although
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they do not offer privacy guarantees, but a probabilis-
tic re-identification model [26] only. For example, Hay
et al. [27] proposed a method, known as random per-
turbation, to anonymize unlabeled graphs using the rand
add/del strategy that randomly removes p edges and then
randomly adds p fake edges. Stokes and Torra [28] pro-
fessed that a suitable selection of the eigenvalues in the
spectral method can perturbate the graph while keeping
its most significative edges. The authors in [29] presented
a strategy which aimed to preserve the most important
edges in the network, trying to maximize data utility while
achieving the desired privacy level.
Several methods have been presented in the category of
constrained perturbation methods, such as k-anonymity
and extended k-anonymity. These methods provide pri-
vacy guarantees, but the level of privacy they offer may
strongly depend on the knowledge of the adversary. The
most basic knowledge of adversary is based on vertex de-
gree [26]. The k-anonymity model was introduced in [30]
and [31] for privacy preservation of structured or relational
data. The k-anonymity model indicates that the attacker
cannot distinguish between different k records, although
he manages to find a group of quasi-identifiers. There-
fore, the attacker can not re-identify an individual with
a probability greater than 1/k [26]. There are some other
models developed attempting to extend the k-anonymity
model to overcome some particular disadvantages. Feder
et al. [19] called a graph (k, l)-anonymous if, for every ver-
tex in the graph, there exist at least k other vertices that
share at least l of their neighbors. Severe weaknesses of
that work were addressed by Stokes and Torra [20].
3. Preliminaries
In this section the preliminary concepts upon which
this work is built will be introduced, including: graph
anonymization and utility assessment of an anonymous
graph.
3.1. Graph Anonymization
Similarly to other works, we model the social network as
a simple graph, in which the degree of a vertex represents
the number of its neighbors. Let G = (V,E) be a social
network graph, where V denotes the set of vertices and E
represents the set of edges. As in [19], we assume, through-
out this paper, that the social network graph is undirected,
unweighted, and contains no self-loops, because this is an
important category of graphs to study. Most of the social
networks, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Orkut and so on,
allow only bidirectional links and are thus instances of such
simple graphs.
Consider a simple graph and an attacker who knows that
a target person and some number of their friends form
a community. In the released graph, the attacker could
find such a community to narrow down the set of nodes
that might correspond to the target individual. The goal
of the anonymization method is to prevent the attacker
from identifying individuals based on their immediate
neighbors. To achieve this, we use the (k, l)-anonymity def-
inition introduced by Feder et al. in 2008. In this def-
inition, it is required that for every node in the graph,
some subset of its neighbors should be shared by other
nodes. In this way, an attacker who knows some sub-
set of the neighbors of the target individual and is even
capable of pinpointing them in the graph, will not be
able to distinguish the target individual from other nodes
in the network that share this subset of neighbors [19].
More formally the (k, l)-anonymity property is defined as
follows.
Definition 1 (k, l)-anonymity [19]. A graph G = (V,E) is
(k, l)-anonymous if for each vertex v ∈V , there exists a set
of vertices U ⊂V not containing v such that |U | ≥ k and for
each u ∈U the vertices u and v share at least l neighbors.
3.2. Utility Assessment of an Anonymous Graph
We now discuss how to measure the utility loss of an
anonymized graph based on topological features of the
graph. For a given original graph G(V,E), G(V,E) is
the (k, l)-anonymous version, such that the utility of the
anonymized graph should be as close as the utility of the
original graph [25]. Zhou and Pei [23], [32] consider the
total number of added edges and the number of vertices
that are not in the neighborhood of the target vertex and
are linked to the anonymized neighborhood for the purpose
of anonymization. Another work in [21] controls the util-
ity loss by preferring the largest frequent subgraphs during
anonymization to impose less graph modification. The total
cost of anonymization is still calculated by the amount of
changes made during perturbation [25]. Although, based
on this criterion, the structural properties of the social net-
work graph are ignored, the number of changes to minimize
the information loss of network graph is still important.
When a social network graph is anonymized, the result-
ing graph loses some utility compared with the original
graph [33]. Some attempts have been made to preserve
the structural properties of a social network graph during
anonymization. Research done by [18], [34] considers local
community structure as the subject of utility preservation.
In [34], the authors proposed an approach in which the
graph is partitioned by a local structure.
In this paper, we have used the average vertex degree
(AVD), the average path length (APL), and the average
closeness centrality (ACC) of the anonymized graph in
comparison with the original graph, in order to evaluate
the proposed method. These three indices, along with the
degree distribution, are considered to be standard measures
in graph-analysis studies. These criteria are defined as fol-
lows (Table 1).
Consider an unweighted and undirected graph G having
the set of vertices V that |V |= n. Assume d(v1,v2), where
v1,v2 ∈ V denote the shortest distance between v1 and v2.
The degree of vertex v is denoted as deg(v).
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Table 1
Notations used in the paper
Notation Description
n Number of graph vertices
k, l Anonymization parameters
degi Degree of vi
AVD Average vertex degree
APL Average path length
ACC Average closeness centrality
CV Candidate vertices
MIP Mixed integer programming
PSPL Pairwise shortest path length
Average vertex degree. The average vertex degree is de-
fined as the average degree of all network nodes [35]. Then,
the average vertex degree AVDG is:
AVDG = 1n ·∑v∈V deg(v).
Average path length. The average path length is defined
as the average number of steps along the shortest paths
between all pairs of reachable network nodes. The average
path length APLG is defined as:
APLG = 1n·(n−1) ·∑i6= j d(vi,v j).
Average closeness centrality. The closeness centrality of
a node is a measure of centrality in a network, calculated
as the reciprocal of the sum of the length of the shortest
paths between the node and all other nodes in the graph.
The average closeness centrality in a graph is given by the
average closeness centrality of all nodes.
4. The proposed Method
In this section, we describe how to satisfy (k, l)-anonymity
in a given graph G = (V,E), dividing the process into two
main parts. First, solving the mathematical model that the
anonymization problem is defined by, using a mixed in-
teger programming in which the best edges are found to
be added to G to produce the anonymous graph G. Second,
post-processing that removes unnecessary edges from G. In
Algorithm 1, the two main parts of the proposed method
are shown. The function accepts a simple graph G(V,E),
anonymization parameters k and l as inputs and produces
an anonymous graph G(V,E ′). The number of vertices is
stored in n in line 1. The pairwise shortest path length ma-
trix corresponding to graph G is computed in line 2. In
line 3, for each newly added edge ei j that connects vi to v j,
its associated cost related to its addition is computed. The
anonymous graph is produced in lines 4–10. For the case
of l = 1 (line 4), the optimal solution is obtained by using
the MIP mathematical model in line 5 that is introduced in
Subsection 4.1. For the case of l > 1, before solving MIP
problem in line 9 that yields G2, a set of candidate vertices
(CV) is computed using the candidateVertices function in
line 8, which is shown in Algorithm 2. In line 10, all
Algorithm 1: The pseudo-code of the proposed
method
Input: G(V,E): original graph, k, l: anonymization
parameters
Output: G(V,E ′): anonymized graph
1 n = |V |
2 PSPL ← pairwise shortest path length matrix of
graph G
3 compute costs(i, j), ∀{vi,v j} ∈ E ′
4 if l == 1 then
5 G←MIPsolver(G,PSPL,k, l,n,costs,deg)
6 else
7 if l > 1 then
8 CV ← candidateVertices(G,PSPL,k, l)
// Algorithm 2
9 G2←
MIPsolver(G,PSPL,k, l,n,costs,deg,CV)
10 G← postProcess(G,G2,k, l)
// Algorithm 3
11 return G
unnecessary added edges are removed from G2 using the
postProcess function (Algorithm 3), then its output is saved
in G, which is returned in line 11.
4.1. Solving Mathematical Model
This paper uses edge addition as the graph-modification
technique to produce the anonymous graph. In order to
produce a useful graph, a general mathematical model of
the problem is introduced that takes into account the k min-
imum number of different vertices sharing l of their neigh-
bors. The model uses the following components:
Definition of sets: The indexes of vertices v ∈ V in the
graph are saved in S.
Fixed parameters and constants: Three parameters n,k,
and l represent the number of vertices, and k and l of the
anonymization model, respectively. Parameter ci j is the
cost of adding the edge ei j that connects vi to v j. The cost
matrix C = [ci j] is symmetric, i.e., ci j = c ji. It is equal
to 0 for connected vertices in the original graph, and as-
sumes a positive value for not connected ones. Therefore,
to reduce the amount of data passed to the solver, only the
upper triangular part of C is applied in practice. Addition-
ally, degi denotes the degree of vi in the original graph.
Independent problem variables: The solution consists of
connected vertices. The binary decision variable xi j de-
termines the connectivity of vi and v j in the produced
anonymized graph, where xi j = 1, if and only if the re-
lated vertices are to be connected. In order to decrease the
space complexity of the final model, we only consider xi j
for j > i, i, j ∈ S, since the graph is undirected (xi j = x ji)
and loop free (xii = 0).
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Objective function: The objective function is to minimize
the aggregate cost of change with respect to the original
graph, i.e.:
min
xi j
∑
i, j∈S,i< j
ci jxi j.
Constraints: The constraints fall into two categories: origi-
nal edge preserving constraints, and anonymization con-
straints.
1. Original edge preserving constraints: none of the
existent edges in the original graph cannot be re-
moved, i.e.:
xi j = 1, ∀ei j ∈ E .
In order to speed up the computation, the warm-start
strategy is used in which xi j = 1 for all of the con-
nected vertices vi and v j.
Anonymization constraints: assume that Nl( j) is the
l neighbors of v j, i.e. Nl( j) = {S j|#S j = l,∀i ∈
S j,(vi,v j) ∈ E}. These constraints enforce that each
l neighbors of a vertex are also the neighbors of at
least k different vertices in the anonymized graph:
∑
w∈S\S′j
(
∏
i∈S′j
xiw
)
≥ k ∀S′j ∈ Nl( j), j ∈ S .
This function is non-linear due to the multiplication
of x-variables. It is required to replace each nonlin-
ear term ∏
i∈S′j
xiw with a new variable z(i1, i2, . . . ,w)
where in ∈ S′j and add linearization constraints in the
following manner:
0≤ z(i1, i2, . . . ,w) ≤ xi1w
0≤ z(i1, i2, . . . ,w) ≤ xi2w
...
0≤ z(i1, i2, . . . ,w) ≤ xi|S′j |w
z(i1, i2, . . . ,w) ≥ xi1w + xi2w +· · ·+ xi|S′j|w
−(|S′j|−1)
In the case of l = 1, as we introduced in [36], for each
k the constraints can be simplified to the constraints
that impose the minimum degree of each vertex to
be at least k, i.e.:
∑
i< j
xi j + ∑
j<i
x ji ≥ k ∀i ∈ S,degi < k .
It is also notable that for a fixed w, ∏
i∈S′j
xiw = ∏
i∈S′′j
xiw
where S′′j is defined in the following:
S′′j = S
′
j−{i|i is connected to w}.
2. Run-time constraint: according to Definition 1, we
call the graph G = (V,E), (k, l)-anonymous, if for
each vertex vi ∈ V , there exist at least l vertices,
which are simultaneously connected to vi and also
to at least k− 1 other vertices. In other words, if
v j ∈ V connects to p vertices and also q other ver-
tices connect to those p vertices, so that |p| ≤ l and
q < k, then the graph G is not (k, l)-anonymous. In
this situation, the MIP solver for finding the mini-
mum cost (k, l)-anonymous graph needs to connect
the vertex v j to at least l− p number of best ver-
tices, so that all of the l vertices are connected to k
other vertices. The MIP solver selects the best ver-
tices (vertices with the minimum cost of adding their
corresponding edges to the original graph) from all
vertices in the graph. Therefore, for large and dense
graphs and in the case of l > 1, implementation of
the proposed method will take a lot of time. In this
paper, in order to solve the problem in a reasonable
time, we have decided that for all combination of l
vertices of the graph G, we propose a set of vertices
to the MIP solver that is called candidate vertices.
These CV corresponding to l vertices are obtained
from the union of their adjacent vertices. The CV
is obtained by using Algorithm 2 (line 8 of Algo-
rithm 1). The CandidateVertices function gets the
original graph G, the PSPL matrix corresponding to
graph G and anonymization parameters k and l. The
CV is generated as the output of the function. In
Algorithm 2, for all combination of l vertices of the
graph G, a sorted vector D is produced in line 2 in
which PSPL(vik , :) is the ik-th row in the pairwise
shortest path length matrix of G. Since the main di-
agonal of the PSPL matrix is zero, the first l elements
in sorted vector D will be zero. In line 3, validIdx
is the index of vertices obtained from (l +1)-th com-
ponent of D and for threshold number (Th ≥ k) of
it. That T h is a positive number that determines the
number of candidate vertices for all combinations of
l vertices. ValidIdx introduces vertices that are con-
sidered for connecting to vertices vi1 , vi2 , . . . , vil .
In line 4, the CV is obtained as a matrix with l +1
dimensions that CV (i1, i2, . . . , il ,validIdx) = 1. For
example, for l = 2 and T h = k, D is obtained by
Eq. (1) that the CV would be a n×n×n matrix that
for each 2-combination (v1,v2), v1,v2 ∈V , the vertex
v is a candidate vertex for connecting to both v1 and
v2 provided by CV(v1,v2,v) = 1, for v ∈ validIdx.
Therefore, CV proposes candidate vertices to the MIP
solver and the MIP solver finds the best vertices from
v to connect them to the vertices {vi1 ,vi2 , . . .vil} ∈V .
D=sortIndex(PSPL(vi1 , :) ·PSPL(vi2 , :)),∀i1, i2 ∈ S.
validIdx = D[3 : 3+ k].
CV(i1, i2,validIdx) = 1.
(1)
In this study, two different variants of the general math-
ematical model have been applied to the original graph.
The difference between these variants consists in the differ-
ent cost functions that are to be minimized in the objective
function. Specifically, the following models are considered:
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Algorithm 2: The pseudo-code of the candidateVer-
tices function
Input: G(V,E): original graph, PSPL: pairwise
shortest path length matrix, k, l:
anonymization parameters
Output: CV candidate vertices
1 foreach l-combination of vi ∈V,∀i ∈ S do
2 D← sortIndex(PSPL(vi1 , :)∗PSPL(vi2 , :
)∗ · · · ∗PSPL(vil , :)), ∀i1, i2, . . . , il ∈ S
3 validIdx← D[l +1 : l +1+Th]
4 CV(i1, i2, . . . , il ,validIdx)← 1
5 return CV
• Model 1. This model is an approach to the implemen-
tation of the Feder et al. [19] anonymization model
that tries to minimize the number of added edges.
In this model, it is assumed that all edges cause
the same level of destruction in the graph, therefore
ci j = 1,∀i, j ∈ S.
• Model 2. It is interesting to add new edges that
minimally change APL of the original graph, which
is an important property of G. This model tries to
add edges that change APL minimally. It is hard to
compute the amount of change in APL for a large
number of sets of candidate edges, since these edges
reinforce the value for other edges. Therefore, the
model approximates the total costs of the number of
newly added edges by aggregating their individual
effects on APL. More precisely, if ci j is the amount
of change in the APL of the original graph caused
by the addition of ei j to G, the total value of change
in the APL for the set of the newly added edges
E ′ ⊂V ×V \ E is approximated by ∑ei j∈E′ ci j.
4.2. Post-process
As mentioned before, in the mathematical model presented
for finding an anonymous graph, for the anonymization pa-
rameter l = 1, the MIP solver will achieve the optimal solu-
tion (because it checks the addition of all possible edges that
are not existent in the original graph and selects the edges
with the minimum cost). If the anonymization parameter is
l > 1, however, in order to solve the mathematical problem
in a reasonable time frame, instead of selecting from all
possible edges, the MIP solver selects the edges from the
set of edges corresponding to the set of candidate vertices.
For this reason, the solution may be non-optimal and some
of the added edges can be deleted from the anonymous
graph. Therefore, the post-process stage is performed for
the case of l > 1, by Algorithm 3 (line 10 of Algorithm 1).
The postProcess function gets the original graph G,
the anonymous graph G2 (from MIPsolver’s output) and
anonymization parameters k and l. The G is the improved
anonymous graph that is generated as the output of the
postProcess function. In line 1, the betweenness centrality
Algorithm 3: The pseudo-code of the postProcess func-
tion
Input: G: original graph, G2: anonymized graph, k, l:
anonymization parameters
Output: G: improved anonymous graph
1 costs← betweenness centrality(G2)
2 M← Ad jacencytMatrix(G)
3 M2← Ad jacencytMatrix(G2)
4 AddedEdges← sort((M2−M)∗ (costs+1))
5 for i = 1 : length(AddedEdges) do
6 if removing AddedEdges(i) from G2 keeps the
graph (k, l)-anonymous then
7 remove AddedEdges(i) from G2
8 G← G2
9 return G
of all edges in graph G2 is computed as costs. The edge be-
tweenness centrality is defined as the number of the shortest
paths that go through an edge in the graph or network [37].
The adjacency matrices corresponding to graphs G and G2
i.e. M and M2 are obtained in lines 2 and 3, respectively.
In line 4, all of the added edges in the anonymized graph
G2 are sorted in a descending order based on the edge be-
tweenness centrality criterion. Then, in lines 5–7, from the
beginning of the sorted AddedEdges list, the possibility of
deleting the edges is checked and all unnecessary edges are
removed from the anonymous graph G2 in line 7. At the
end of Algorithm 3, G is set by the improved anonymous
graph G2 and is returned as output in line 9. Each edge
in the network can be associated with an edge betweenness
centrality value. An edge with a high edge betweenness
centrality score represents a bridge-like connector between
two parts of the network, with their removal potentially af-
fecting communication between many pairs of nodes, based
on the shortest paths between them [38]. Therefore, delet-
ing the edge with the greatest betweenness centrality value
will bring the structure of the anonymized graph closer to
the original one by increasing APL.
5. Empirical Evaluations
In this section, we conduct some experiments to validate
the proposed method. The aim of these experiments is to
show the strengths and weaknesses of model 1 and model 2,
as an implementation method of the Feder et al. model [19]
and the proposed method, respectively. In all experiments,
a laptop with an Intel Core i7 2 GHz CPU, 16 GB of
main memory and the Windows 8 64-bit operating system
is used. The models have been solved using CPLEX/GAMS
MIP [39] software.
First, the datasets that have been used in the experiments are
introduced in Subsection 5.1. Then, the results are shown
in Subsection 5.2. In all experiments, the degree of change
in AVD, APL, and ACC is used to measure utility, as in-
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Table 2
Structural properties of synthetic and real graphs
Dataset Vertices Edges AVD APL ACC
SF50 50 96 3.8400 2.8433 0.0073
SF100 100 196 3.9200 2.9048 0.0035
SF200 200 396 3.4449 3.9600 0.0015
RA82 82 94 2.2927 5.7350 0.0022
RA129 129 178 2.7597 4.8307 0.0017
RA176 176 238 2.7045 5.4292 0.0011
karate 34 78 4.5882 2.4082 0.0129
dwt 72 72 75 3.0833 8.2254 0.0018
lesmis 77 254 6.5974 2.6411 0.0051
can 96 96 336 8.0000 4.4105 0.0024
polbooks 105 441 8.4000 3.0788 0.0032
football 115 613 10.6609 2.5082 0.0035
troduced in Subsection 3.2. The weaker the modification of
these measures caused by the method concerned, the better
the anonymized graph is suited for future investigation.
5.1. Datasets
The proposed method is applied to a number of synthetic
and real graph datasets that are available online to see its
performance in different topologies. Structural properties
of these graphs are shown in Table 2. For each graph, the
number of vertices, the number of edges and other struc-
tural properties described in Subsection 3.2, such as AVD,
APL, and ACC, are reported. The synthetic datasets are
summarized as follows:
• SF – a scale-free dataset based on the Barabasi’s
model. This graph is a connected graph, where ver-
tex degrees are drawn from a power-law distribution
similar to real-world social networks;
• RA – a random network based on the Erdos-Renyi
model in which vertices are connected based on prob-
ability p.
Additionally, six real datasets are tested in a similar manner
to assess our method in different topologies:
• karate – a social network of friendships between 34
members of a karate club at a US university in the
1970s;
• dwt – this collection consists of thirty matrix patterns
collected by Gordon Everstine of the David W. Tay-
lor Naval Ship Research and Development Center,
Bethesda, MD, USA. These patterns were collected
from various US military and NASA users of NASA’s
structural engineering package NASTRAN, for use
as a benchmark collection for variable bandwidth re-
ordering heuristics;
• lesmis – co-appearance weighted network of charac-
ters in the novel “Les Miserables”;
• can – a graph that has a symmetric pattern made of
cans;
Table 3
The amount of AVD error for different values of k and l and for the proposed method and for the Feder et al. [19] model
applied to synthetic graphs. In each experiment, the best value is highlighted
Graph Method l
k
Method l
k
3 5 7 10 3 5 7 10
SF50
1 0.4000 1.8400 3.4800 6.2400 1 0.4000 1.7600 3.4400 6.2400
Proposed method 2 6.5200 10.9200 14.4800 18.2000 Feder et al. 2 6.6800 11.0000 14.5200 18.1600
3 8.0400 14.1200 17.8000 22.1600 3 6.6800 13.1600 17.5200 22.1600
SF100
1 0.5600 2.1600 3.8400 6.5200 1 0.5000 2.1000 3.8000 6.5000
Proposed method 2 10.9000 16.7000 21.2600 27.0200 Feder et al. 2 10.0600 16.3800 20.9400 27.0800
3 14.2800 22.5600 27.7800 34.2800 3 12.5600 21.8600 12.4600 18.0800
SF200
1 0.5300 2.0600 3.8300 6.6400 1 0.4500 1.9100 3.6600 6.4400
Proposed method 2 12.2000 19.2000 25.6500 32.5400 Feder et al. 2 11.1600 19.2700 25.9100 34.2600
3 4.2000 8.3100 12.3800 18.2000 3 4.2000 8.3100 12.3800 18.2000
RA82
1 1.0244 2.9268 4.8537 7.8537 1 0.9512 2.7317 4.7073 7.7073
Proposed method 2 3.8780 7.7317 10.9268 15.0000 Feder et al. 2 4.2683 7.3659 10.9512 14.8537
3 3.9268 7.3171 11.1463 16.1707 3 3.5122 7.3415 11.3171 15.8780
RA129
1 0.8217 2.4031 4.3721 7.3643 1 0.7287 2.3256 4.2636 7.2403
Proposed method 2 5.5814 9.7674 14.2326 19.9070 Feder et al. 2 5.4109 9.7674 14.4031 19.8140
3 5.5814 10.0310 14.0620 21.3333 3 5.1783 9.9380 13.9690 21.1938
RA176
1 0.8523 2.4318 4.3636 7.3636 1 0.7841 2.3977 4.3068 7.2955
Proposed method 2 5.7386 9.7386 13.7614 19.5341 Feder et al. 2 5.8977 9.8750 13.9091 19.0568
3 5.7159 10.2273 13.7727 20.5000 3 5.6591 9.7386 14.2386 19.9091
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Table 4
The amount of AVD error for different values of k and l and for the proposed method and for the Feder et al. [19] model
applied to real-world graphs. In each experiment, the best value is highlighted
Graph Method l
k
Method l
k
3 5 7 10 3 5 7 10
karate
1 0.4706 1.7059 3.2941 5.8824 1 0.4118 1.6471 3.2941 5.8824
Proposed method 2 5.1765 9.3529 11.7647 14.5294 Feder et al. 2 4.4118 8.8235 11.5882 14.5294
3 6.5882 11.0588 14.0000 17.5882 3 5.2353 11.4118 13.1176 17.6471
dwt 72
1 1.0000 2.9722 4.9722 7.9722 1 0.9722 2.9167 4.9167 7.9167
Proposed method 2 2.7222 6.7222 9.3889 12.8056 Feder et al. 2 2.7222 6.7222 9.3611 12.7222
3 2.7500 6.7222 9.5278 13.1111 3 2.7500 6.7500 9.47221 12.8889
lesmis
1 0.6234 1.5584 2.7532 4.8312 1 0.5714 1.4805 2.4675 4.5195
Proposed method 2 6.1299 11.2987 14.9351 19.7922 Feder et al. 2 5.6883 10.6234 14.9351 19.9740
3 4.2857 7.8961 18.1039 24.6753 3 11.7922 15.3766 19.6883 24.9091
can 96
1 0.0000 0.0000 1.3333 3.3333 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.6667 3.0000
Proposed method 2 3.5417 7.3750 10.4375 14.9792 Feder et al. 2 3.4792 7.8333 10.7708 15.0625
3 7.0000 10.6250 14.5417 19.1458 3 7.9375 12.1667 15.0000 18.5417
polbooks
1 0.0190 0.4000 1.3333 3.3333 1 0.0190 0.2857 1.2000 3.2381
Proposed method 2 6.7238 11.6381 15.5429 21.5238 Feder et al. 2 5.1048 10.0952 15.4476 21.2571
3 3.8667 7.9619 20.4190 27.2762 3 3.8667 7.9619 11.8286 28.2667
football
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1913 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1217
Proposed method 2 8.2783 14.0522 18.7652 25.4261 Feder et al. 2 7.8783 13.8783 18.9565 25.6696
3 4.7826 8.8000 12.5043 17.7043 3 4.7826 8.8000 12.5043 17.7043
Table 5
The amount of APL error for different values of k and l for the proposed method and for the Feder et al. [19] model
applied to synthetic graphs. In each experiment, the best value is highlighted
Graph Method l
k
Method l
k
3 5 7 10 3 5 7 10
SF50
1 0.0275 0.1472 0.3937 0.7244 1 0.0672 0.4035 0.6476 0.9088
Proposed method 2 0.8591 1.0615 1.1456 1.2346 Feder et al. 2 0.8999 1.0672 1.1595 1.2354
3 0.8950 1.1382 1.2223 1.3170 3 0.9562 1.1235 1.2191 1.3170
SF100
1 0.0185 0.0609 0.2154 0.4588 1 0.0324 0.2507 0.4322 0.6449
Proposed method 2 0.8718 1.0522 1.1225 1.1871 Feder et al. 2 0.8441 1.0550 1.1229 1.1889
3 0.9572 1.1209 1.1910 1.2602 3 0.9742 1.1188 1.0413 1.0980
SF200
1 0.0042 0.1035 0.3025 0.5887 1 0.0674 0.3588 0.6084 0.8624
Proposed method 2 1.1604 1.4144 1.5202 1.5894 Feder et al. 2 1.1516 1.4265 1.5410 1.6154
3 1.4687 1.4894 1.5098 1.5391 3 1.4687 1.4894 1.5098 1.5391
RA82
1 0.2143 1.4763 2.2697 2.9009 1 1.6521 2.7352 3.1845 3.4299
Proposed method 2 2.5621 3.1125 3.3643 3.6067 Feder et al. 2 2.6834 3.1574 3.4176 3.6518
3 2.4564 3.1098 3.4109 3.6729 3 2.4871 3.1833 3.5082 3.7199
RA129
1 0.1590 0.9227 1.5043 1.9891 1 0.6486 1.5853 2.0178 2.3767
Proposed method 2 2.0746 2.4457 2.6544 2.8300 Feder et al. 2 2.0926 2.4628 2.6765 2.8623
3 2.0110 2.4569 2.6622 2.8580 3 1.9873 2.4640 2.6766 2.8830
RA176
1 0.2011 0.9942 1.6827 2.2745 1 0.8921 1.9239 2.4338 2.8156
Proposed method 2 2.4295 2.8372 3.0393 3.2186 Feder et al. 2 2.5297 2.8714 3.0653 3.2452
3 2.3297 2.8523 3.0745 3.2801 3 2.4284 2.8485 3.0863 3.2912
• polbooks – a network of books about US politics,
sold by Amazon. Edges in the network show the
frequent purchases made by buyers. Data compiled
by V. Krebs (www.orgnet.com);
• football – a network of American football games
between Division IA colleges during the regular
Fall 2000 season, as compiled by M. Girvan and
M. Newman.
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Table 6
The amount of APL error for different values of k and l for the proposed method and for the Feder et al. [19] model
applied to real-world graphs. In each experiment, the best value is highlighted
Graph Method l
k
Method l
k
3 5 7 10 3 5 7 10
karate
1 0.0566 0.0084 0.0682 0.3178 1 0.0522 0.2892 0.4711 0.6333
Proposed method 2 0.4871 0.7384 0.8293 0.9096 Feder et al. 2 0.5816 0.7295 0.8276 0.9167
3 0.5210 0.7937 0.9007 1.0094 3 0.6279 0.8097 0.8739 1.0112
dwt 72
1 1.7117 3.8509 4.6897 5.2770 1 3.2516 4.2930 5.5074 5.9069
Proposed method 2 4.3224 5.1851 5.5912 5.8576 Feder et al. 2 4.3224 5.3146 5.5575 5.8580
3 4.2660 5.2406 5.6358 5.9002 3 4.4167 5.3955 5.6260 5.9061
lesmis
1 0.0223 0.0112 0.0669 0.1923 1 0.0361 0.1229 0.2418 0.3946
Proposed method 2 0.4954 0.7254 0.8293 0.9390 Feder et al. 2 0.6058 0.7189 0.8416 0.9387
3 0.7500 0.7976 0.8724 0.9965 3 0.7965 0.8792 0.9127 1.0122
can 96
1 0.0459 0.0459 0.0935 0.1984 1 0.0459 0.0459 1.0453 1.8569
Proposed method 2 0.5907 1.7659 2.0946 2.3190 Feder et al. 2 1.5547 2.0905 2.2089 2.3313
3 1.3738 1.9106 2.2207 2.3995 3 1.9970 2.1569 2.2788 2.3786
polbooks
1 0.0264 0.0094 0.0304 0.1262 1 0.0077 0.1170 0.4212 0.7243
Proposed method 2 0.6234 0.9291 1.1033 1.2580 Feder et al. 2 0.7908 1.0057 1.1390 1.2681
3 1.1674 1.2068 1.1273 1.3097 3 1.1674 1.2068 1.2439 1.3441
football
1 0.0218 0.0218 0.0218 0.0151 1 0.0218 0.0218 0.0218 0.0052
Proposed method 2 0.4952 0.6642 0.7349 0.8026 Feder et al. 2 0.5431 0.6897 0.7443 0.8050
3 0.6218 0.6571 0.6896 0.7352 3 0.6218 0.6571 0.6896 0.7352
Table 7
The amount of ACC error for different values of k and l for the proposed method and for the Feder et al. [19] model
applied to synthetic graphs. In each experiment, the best value is highlighted
Graph Method l
k
Method l
k
3 5 7 10 3 5 7 10
SF50
1 0.0001 0.0005 0.0013 0.0026 1 0.0003 0.0013 0.0022 0.0036
Proposed method 2 0.0033 0.0046 0.0052 0.0059 Feder et al. 2 0.0036 0.0046 0.0053 0.0059
3 0.0036 0.0051 0.0058 0.0067 3 0.0040 0.0050 0.0058 0.0067
SF100
1 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0007 1 0.0001 0.0004 0.0006 0.0010
Proposed method 2 0.0015 0.0020 0.0022 0.0025 Feder et al. 2 0.0015 0.0020 0.0022 0.0025
3 0.0018 0.0023 0.0025 0.0028 3 0.0018 0.0022 0.0021 0.0023
SF200
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 1 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005
Proposed method 2 0.0007 0.0010 0.0012 0.0013 Feder et al. 2 0.0007 0.0010 0.0012 0.0013
3 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012 3 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012
RA82
1 0.0001 0.0008 0.0015 0.0023 1 0.0009 0.0020 0.0027 0.0033
Proposed method 2 0.0018 0.0027 0.0032 0.0038 Feder et al. 2 0.0020 0.0028 0.0033 0.0040
3 0.0017 0.0027 0.0033 0.0040 3 0.0017 0.0028 0.0036 0.0042
RA129
1 0.0001 0.0004 0.0007 0.0011 1 0.0002 0.0008 0.0012 0.0016
Proposed method 2 0.0012 0.0017 0.0020 0.0024 Feder et al. 2 0.0013 0.0017 0.0021 0.0024
3 0.0012 0.0017 0.0020 0.0024 3 0.0012 0.0017 0.0021 0.0025
RA176
1 0.0000 0.0002 0.0005 0.0008 1 0.0002 0.0006 0.0009 0.0011
Proposed method 2 0.0009 0.0012 0.0014 0.0016 Feder et al. 2 0.0009 0.0012 0.0014 0.0016
3 0.0008 0.0012 0.0014 0.0016 3 0.0009 0.0012 0.0014 0.0017
5.2. Comparing the Proposed Method with the Feder
Model
The following sections show the degree of utility distortion
resulting from the modification of graph required to pro-
duce a (k, l)-anonymous graph. Tables 3, 5, and 7 show
the amount of change in AVD, APL, and ACC of anony-
mous graphs in comparison with original ones for synthetic
graph datasets, respectively. Table 3 shows the AVD error
for anonymous graphs and compares it with correspond-
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Table 8
The amount of ACC error for different values of k and l for the proposed method and for the Feder et al. [19] model
applied to real-world graphs. In each experiment, the best value is highlighted
Graph Method l
k
Method l
k
3 5 7 10 3 5 7 10
karate
1 0.0001 0.0003 0.0007 0.0022 1 0.0006 0.0020 0.0034 0.0049
Proposed method 2 0.0037 0.0062 0.0073 0.0084 Feder et al. 2 0.0047 0.0062 0.0073 0.0086
3 0.0041 0.0069 0.0085 0.0101 3 0.0052 0.0073 0.0082 0.0102
dwt 72
1 0.0005 0.0016 0.0024 0.0032 1 0.0012 0.0020 0.0037 0.0046
Proposed method 2 0.0020 0.0031 0.0039 0.0046 Feder et al. 2 0.0020 0.0033 0.0038 0.0046
3 0.0020 0.0032 0.0040 0.0047 3 0.0021 0.0035 0.0040 0.0047
lesmis
1 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 1 0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 0.0009
Proposed method 2 0.0012 0.0019 0.0023 0.0028 Feder et al. 2 0.0015 0.0019 0.0024 0.0028
3 0.0021 0.0023 0.0026 0.0032 3 0.0022 0.0026 0.0028 0.0032
can 96
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0018
Proposed method 2 0.0004 0.0017 0.0022 0.0028 Feder et al. 2 0.0014 0.0022 0.0025 0.0028
3 0.0011 0.0019 0.0025 0.0030 3 0.0021 0.0024 : 0.0027 0.0029
polbooks
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 1 0.0000 0.0001 0.0005 0.0010
Proposed method 2 0.0008 0.0014 0.0018 0.0022 Feder et al. 2 0.0011 0.0016 0.0019 0.0023
3 0.0020 0.0021 0.0019 0.0024 3 0.0020 0.0021 0.0023 0.0025
football
1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Proposed method 2 0.0009 0.0013 0.0015 0.0017 Feder et al. 2 0.0010 0.0014 0.0015 0.0017
3 0.0012 0.0014 0.0015 0.0017 3 0.0012 0.0014 0.0015 0.0017
Table 9
The average execution time (in seconds) for the proposed method and for the Feder et al. model
Graph
Execution time [s] for Feder et al. model Execution time [s] for proposed method
Cost time Solve time Post-process time Whole time Cost time Solve time Post-process time Whole time
karate 0.0007 25.0539 0.0722 30.5104 0.0362 4.9168 0.0760 11.9279
dwt 72 0.0000 3.5578 0.0152 7.3205 0.3596 3.6221 0.0162 7.5697
lesmis 0.0012 5137.9768 0.7115 5174.1992 0.3597 4491.9676 0.7061 4519.3890
can 96 0.0002 5047.8342 0.2352 5064.9843 0.5451 1833.5432 0.1329 1849.7912
polbooks 0.0001 5241.9255 0.8628 5292.6429 2.8282 5067.6278 1.8566 5146.3476
football 0.0036 6829.3870 1.6720 6840.1676 1.2615 6729.2509 1.9699 6740.8451
SF50 0.0003 995.9613 0.2244 1002.8781 0.1574 61.7497 0.1952 67.0347
SF100 0.0003 5613.8762 0.7388 5622.0445 2.3944 5130.4746 1.3076 5140.5596
SF200 0.0004 6936.9346 2.5641 6999.5473 8.6035 6820.4279 1.3090 6915.9520
RA82 0.0002 7.0836 0.0628 13.5097 0.4928 6.3735 0.03290 11.9961
RA129 0.0019 1727.7701 0.0915 1741.1626 4.3179 32.7018 0.2013 51.8183
RA176 0.0002 1795.2124 0.11818 1824.7315 8.9662 52.5578 0.1280 82.9223
ing original graphs for different k, l (k ∈ {3,5,7,10}, l ∈
{1,2,3})and for proposed method and for the Feder et al.
model are shown. Similarly, Tables 5 and 7 are concerned
with APL and ACC errors, while Tables 4, 6, and 8 are
about AVD error, APL error, and ACC error of real-world
graphs, respectively.
The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 show that, in most
cases, the Feder et al. model achieves the best AVD, espe-
cially in all experiments for l = 1. This is rational, since
the main objective of the model is to add a minimum num-
ber of edges to the original graph. Therefore, the (average)
degree of vertices are changes minimally. However, for the
cases of l > 1, our implementation suggests an approximate
approach that uses CV, which means that in some cases the
proposed method may be the winner with respect to AVD
error. Anyway, the relative differences are negligible. For
example, AVD error of the proposed method for SF200,
k = 5 and l = 2 equals to 19.2 while the value is 19.27
for the [19]. As expected, Tables 5–8 confirm the superi-
ority of the proposed method in almost all cases in terms
of APL and ACC errors. These values confirm that us-
ing a more precise cost function for adding new edges to
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produce anonymous graphs, even for an approximated ap-
proach in the cases of l > 1, yields more useful datasets than
the naı¨ve approach used by [19]. These degree of superior-
ity is more evident for APL errors, as the proposed method
is optimized for this scenario. For instance, APL error
for the proposed method is 0.1262 in polbooks for k = 10
and l = 1, while the value is 0.7243 for [19]. A similar
discussion is true for ACC error, i.e. the proposed method
achieves, usually, a result that is better than or equivalent to
that shown in [19], since the proposed method attempts to
introduce new edges that do not change the structural prop-
erties of the underlying original graph. In brief, the results
confirm that the trivial idea of trying to only add a mini-
mum number of edges does not necessarily achieve the best
results, and that using a more elegant way to introduce new
edges may produce more useful datasets.
5.3. Proposed Method Execution Time
In this section, the execution time of the proposed method
is reported. The entire execution time consist of cost time,
mathematical problem solution time, and post-process time.
Table 9 shows these components of the proposed method’s
execution time. The results of the entire time columns
confirm that the anonymization problem can be solved in
a reasonable time frame, because it is usually considered as
an oﬄine problem. The entire time and solution time of the
proposed method are better, in most cases, in comparison
with the Feder et al. model. But, as far as the cost time
columns are concerned, the Feder et al. model is quicker,
in most cases, than the proposed method.
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